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AN ECONOHIC COHPARISON o_
THREE HEAVY LIFT AIrbORNE -""STEMS
Bernard H. Carson*
ABSTRACT: Current state of art trends indicate that a
50-ton payload helicopter could be built by the end of
the decade. However, alternative aircraft that employ
LTA principles are shown to be more economically attrac-
tive, both in term_ of investment and operating costs
for the ultra-heavy lift role. Costing methodology
follows rationale developed by airframe manufacturers,
and includes learning curve factors.
t
: _ In this country, we ha;e about a decade of experience with helicopters
' designed for the heavy lift role; at present, ten tons of payload canbe transported from one random point to another and this capability
- has already made an impact in military operations, and tile construc-
tion and logging industries, to name a few more not::ble applications.
-_ A wide variety of other uses have been found that, taken together,
assure us that the heavy lift helicopter zs become an acceptable,
and in some cases a urique solution to some of our complex trans-
portational requirements. But) as experience is gained, payload
limitations are becoming rapidly apparent, and it is logical to look
beyond the present in an effort to identify the options that exist in
advancing current heavy lift technology.
This paper deals with the economics of heavy lift systems, but in a
sense, it may be viewed as a technology assessment presented in an
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economic framework; economics and technology appear to be somewhat
inseparable. It is alse fair to point out that the subsequent text
deals with direct _conomics of design, development, construction and
operation of heavy lift systems, a_d makes no attempt to address the
indirect economic benefits that will almost cer_ainlv accrue in a
variety of future heavy lift applications; that aspect is lett to
other authors whose efforts, appearing concurrently witt, this one,
will treat this subject in some depth.
/
For this study, we have chosen three such systems. The first is an
extcapolation of current, or near-timeframe heavy lift helicopter
tech,ology to a fifty-ten payload machine. The second is the hybrid
Aerc .ane as proposed by All American Engineering Corporation, also +
of fifty ton payload capacity. The last is a device that is an
admixture of Lighter Than Air technology and existing helicopters, as
proposed by Piasecki Aircraft. None of these systems exist, or are ._
likely to in the next few years, even if work were to be begun at
_.. once on some or all of them. In economic forecasting, a "few years"
may be an an unacceptably long time, conslderin_ present inflationary
trends; nevertheless, conclusions reached on the basis of comparative
costs should be relatively immune to this effect.
Baseline Lifting Capability
Mostly as a matter of convenience, but with some rationale, the pay-
load to be held common to these three systems is established at fifty
U.S. tons (100,000) lb). All American Engineering Company has effec-
tively sized such a machine (E-l) and conducted a comprehensive
design study during the course of their general feasibility efforts,
and it thus seems appropriate to view this effort as a logical begin-
ning for purposes ot comparison. From a military standpoint, a
fifty ton sling load is an all inchsive capability, except for the
main battle tank and the he-viest mobile artillery pieces. In corn-
rnercial applicatio_ _, a fift_ ton payload seem3 also to satis:v most
requirements excepting large mclear reactor components, and very
large tree harvesting operations. Other ba::etine parameters wil'l he
developed subsequently, appropriate to the aircraft under considera-
tion.
S0-Ton Heavy Lift Helicopter Point Design
Since the best U.S. production helicopter to date has a design pay-
load of 1Z.5 t_ns, it is necessary, before becoming greatly exercised
about a S0-ton iliA[, to establish that such a machine is technically
feasible within the constraints imposed by near-time airframe and
engine technology. It "s to this end tha't the following assessment
i s made.
Nuch effort has gone towards the advancen.ent of hel_copter techno_o._y
in the past thirty years or so, but remarkably few helicopters ha_e
been designed from the outset _ith the heavy lift roIe in mind; what-
ever else may be said, the Soviets have been completely do_;inant in




' /% _ helicopter appears to be the Hughes prototype YH-17 (1952) (calledthe Sky Crane ) which had a design gross weight (DGW) of 52,000 lb.,
'V and a lifting ability of 27,000 lb. Subsequently, in the U.S., we
have developed helicopters having payloads in excess of 10 tons (the
l CH-53, 54 series) while in the USSR_ the Mil-series designs, which
_- p / started in 1957, appear to have peaked out as long ago as 1969, when ;
_-, _._ the MI-12 set a world payload record by lifting 34.2 tons to an alti-
tude of 2,000 meters. Present on-going efforts here are centered
:" about the U.S Army-sponsc ed Heavy Lift Helicopter, the Boeing-
Vertol prototype presently under schedule to fly in 1975. This air-
craft has a design payload of 22.5 tons and features a great deal of "
advanced materials applications as a means of keeping the structural ,:
_, weight fraction within bounds2. ,-
TABLE I _
F.A.I. Heavy Lift Helicopter Records: "_
Greatest Payload Carried to 2,000 Meters
"-" Date Aircraft Load _
%,
• 17 Dec 1955 YAK-24 (USSR) 4,000 Kg (8,818 lb.)
ii Oct 1956 HR2S-I (USA) 6,010 Kg (13,249 lb.)
50 Oct 1957 Mil-6 (USSR) 12,004 Kg (26,464 lb.)
.. 25 Sep 1961 MiI-10 (USSR) 15,I05 Kg (33,296 lb.) :
15 Sep 1962 Mi1-6 (USSR) 20,117 Kg (44,350 lb.)
6 Aug 1969 Mil-12 (USSR) 40,205 Kg (88,656 lb.)
It is in fact the growth of structural weight =rac_on which stands
: alone as a chief concern when contemplating large aircraft of any j
_ description• For baseline estimates, the square-cube law may be
' invoked. But in practice, this produces an overly-pessimistic pic- i/ ture since many aircraft components (e.g., flight instruments and
avionics) do not scale up with aircraft size, and other major com- 1
ponents such as engines :lave not historically followed this scaling _
law due to continuous ir,provements in state of art.
It is interesting, and as it turns out, highly instructive, therefore, t
to examine what sparse data exists on "scratch-built" heavy lift
helicopters as a first attempt to determine the trend of empty weight
fraction as a functiou of design gross weight. lF-2 summarizes this effort, revealing what appears to be a remarkably
simple picture of structural weight growth for large helicopters.
Two distinct trends are evident, one for _he Soviet and the other for
U.S. efforts. Study of these trends indicates some significant
aspects. First, it can be seen that the Soviets gave high priority
to the development of large helicopters as far back as twenty years
ago. The Mil-6, which first flew in 1957, has a design gross weight
of 95,000 lb. and a payload in excess of 50,000 lb., both figures
roughly double the best U.S. effort to date. Then followed the Mil-8
and the Mil-10, which first flew in 1966. With this technological





: development of an ultra-large machine. This resulted in the Nil-12, "
which first flew in 1969, and, after a series of improvements, estab- ,
lished the payload record mentioned above. _
-_ EMPTY WEIGHT FRACTION VS. DESIGN GROSS MIL-I2 _ ,;
WEIGHT FOR US,USSR TURBINE HELICOPTERS o_ _'_:
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Of greater significance than its impressive size, however, is the _;,
indication that the Hil-12 is, or rather was, the largest helicopter ("
payload configuration that could be developed within the constraint '
of their structural weight growth trend. To see this, it is only _
necessary to translate this trend into an approximate analytical
expression, i.e.,






where We, Wo are the empty and design gross weights; and defining _I'
"payload" to include not only useful payload, but crew and fuel
weights, then Wp/Wo = 1-We/Wo, and there results
Wp = 0.46Wo 0.10W_/10S
which shows that there is a value of W that will produce the maximum
payload. This simple model predicts teat payload to be 53,000 lb, '_
corresponding to a design gross weight of 230,000 lb. This may be
s,,
compared with data taken from Ref. 2, which lists the DGW for the _
Mil-12 at 213,000 lb. and a design payload of 55,000 lb. It is thus
tentatively suggested that the Soviets had, in 1969, designed the _.:
ultimate load-lifting helicopter allowable within their technology.
In keeping with their structural weight growth trend, a 50 ton pay- ,'
load helicopter would have been quite out of the question. , '
The U.S. experience in heavy lift helicopter design shows a better
structural weight fraction trend than the Soviets, probably because
the early lack of comparably large shaft engines demanded that
greater attention be given to detailed structural design. This has ,
also had the effect of providing incentives to develop weight saving
materials (e.g., composites) for secondary structural applications.
In any event, whether this trend can be maintained (or bettez yet,
reduced) for U.S. helicopters of arbitrary size is a question that
cannot be answered at the present. Assuming that this trend were
maintained, however, we find, by application of the above rationale,
that the maximum payload is about 78.5 tons, at a DGW of 550,000 lb.
Thus, while we have not "proved" that there is an upper limit to a
U.S. helicopter payload, we have, through this exercise, been
encouraged to believe that a S0-ton payload helicopter is not a
technical impossibility, at least according to current U.S. struc-
tural weight growth trends.
For present purposes, then, it is assumed that this trend well repre
sents a technically feasible configuration in the 50 ton payload
range, and, with a 10% payload allowance for fuel, sizes out nomi- '_
nall¥ to be a 260,000 DGW helicopter having a payload (including
fuel) of II0,000 lb. This gives a structural weight factor of 0.577.
With this as a base, the 50 ton ELH sizes out fairly rapidly by using
fixed component weight fractions and disk loadings for the Boeing
Vertol HLH as a reference. Assuming a 22% rotor overlap, a 228'
length emerges for a tandem rotor configuration, based on a 128'
rotor diameter. This was determined3 by.assuming a rotor figure of
merit of 0.78. A total of 30,000 SHP is required for this aircraft,
allowing for a mechanical transmission efficiency of 0.95. Four
engines of the Allison TT01-AD-700 type, or its derivatives, should
suffice. This engine is rated at 8,075 SHP, and is currently under
development for the Boeing Vertol HLH. F-5 illustrates the compo-
sition of empty weight fraction for the two aircraft.
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A P P/F _'
_ Weight Stretch Factors for 50 Ton HLH Based on _ .
_.._. Boeing/ Vertol XCH-64 _;z
F-3
+
The Aerocrane concept as proposed by All American Engineering Company
is described elsewhere, but for completeness, a brief description is
included here. ._
As shown in F-l, the Aerocrane consists of an aerostatic sphere that
supports a set of equitorially mounted, cruciform wings. In opera-
tion, this assembly is rotated by wing-mounted engines and propellers.
With this arrangement, aerodynamic lift is developed on the wings
that adds to the aerostatic force so that lift can be controlled in
+ the hovering mode. Control is directed from a non-rotating cab
supported by the main structure. In the proposed fifty-ton version,
the useful load divides in a roughly equal way between aerodynamic .
and aerostatic lift. In addition, all structural weight of the ,,
a_rcraft is supported by the aerostat, which has been sized for that
purpose. Wing (or rotor) incidence is both cyclically and collec-
tively controllable, so the aircraft hovers and translates in much
the same fashion as a helicopter, except when the overall buoyancy )
of the system is positive; in this case forward flight is obtained
by _ilting the aircraft backwards, and using negative lift to propel _
the craft at constant altitude. For system parameters used in this
study, the reade, is referred to Ref. 4.
L
"Gargantua" (see F-4) is the name adopted by the Piasecki Aircraft i_
Corporation to describe a heavy lift device that is engagingly :;
simple; it places no demands on state of art, and could presumably be
built almost immediately with relatively low technological risk. As ,:
can be seen, it consists of a large rigid airship hull built along
the lines of the Akron/Macon design, except that all engines, controls
and other subsystems have been transferred from the hull to four
helicopters attached to the lifting envelope by two crossover, or
"saddle" beams. In principle, the aerostatic lift of the hull com-
80
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pensates for the entire dead weight of the system, which includes the
basic hull and saddle weights, and the fully-fueled helicopter _eights
as well. The total helicopter lift (equal to the DGW of the four _
helicopters) can then be used for lifting and propelllng the system. _ _
In the configuration shown, this would amount to about 84 tons, cor- 1responding to four CH-SSD's.
_ As with the Aerocrane, a separate paper on this subject appears con-
currently with this one, to which the re._der is referred for addi-
tional details 5. j
Cost of 6argantua - Since no rigid airships have been built for abou: _ ":
_. 40 years, there is no relevant experience base whatever on which to |_,
_ _ draw in terms of unit airframe costs. The AKRON, having a gross
weight of 460,000 lb., cost $5.3 million, about half of wh_.ch went
into tooling and hangaring costs, since her sister ship, the MACON,
cost only about $2.6 million. During construction of these craft,
vast amounts of hand labor were employed at rates that were cheap
e,'en by :he standards of the era, since the depression was then in
_.,.-, full swing It seems fairly certain that this construction philoso- '_
phy would not prove profitable, or perhaps even possible in the
present age. A comprehensive study, performed by a task force of
design engineers, manufacturing specialists, and costing experts, is
probably reqt,_red to determine the optimum capita? investment in air-
frame fabrication machinery, as weighed against lauor costs as can be
" foreseen in the 1980 timeframe. On the other hand, the traditional
rigid airship structure is highly parts-redundant, suggesting that a
diverse subcontracting approach that made use of the excess capacity
of major airframe manufacturers might be a productive option. If
this were done, a reasonable first estirate for unit airframe costs
might be $10-$20/lb. (typical "low technology," i.e., light aircraft
? figures) the higher figure probably the more appropriate one initi-
ally, with costs tending toward the lower figure as experience was
_' gained. This would put the cost of the basic Gargantua airship hull
at somewhere between four and eight million dollars.
As for the helicopters, it may be supposed that surplus military air-
craft (if they exist) would be used on a "proof of concept" proto-
type, but a serious commercial or military venture would surely
require new aircraft, probably in the $3-8 millior cost category,
depending on the extent of modification required to existing designs,
and whether they were intended to operate in the helicopter (as
opposed to the completely captive) mode part of the time. Allowing
for fail-safe interconnects, winching equipment and other auxiliary
gear, initial production Gargantuas might cost as little as $20
million, and as much as $40 million, or thereabouts. Until the
Gargantua proposal moves past the concept and into the preliminary
design phase, more energetic attempts to pinpoint its development,
production, and operating costs appear to be futile.
Costing Methodology
The remainder of this paper is concerned with the £eneration of esti-
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mates for the costs associated with the acquisition and operation of !
: the remaining two aircraft.
.... In general, aircraft costing methodolog Z follows an application of
-- established trends based upon mission requirements, cost analyses of
existing designs, historical trends, state of art potentials, and
complexity factors. The actual process of generating total costs for
: a given configurational design then depends on the "order of esti-
_. mate" appropriate to the study phase. To clarify, first order-
estimates of acquisition costs can be obtained from relatively
_, simple microscopic cost trends. Independent variables appropriate to
this order are speed, range, payload, gross weight, installed horse- '
power, number of aircraft produced, and so forth. As the design "
evolves, individual components and subsystems begin to crystallize ..#:
in terms of size and weight, and second-order e_timating rationale
_j_ can be applied (with liberal amounts of compute:r time) to provide a 'i:
more refined estimate of total costs. Table II indicates an example
---'_ of the informational detail necessary to proceed with this costing "
phase. In the terminal design phase, estimates become interwoven
with reality (mostly as a result of prototype experience) and cost "_
estimating is confined to design change practices.
_. In a paper of this scope, it is obviously not possible to develop
cost figures much beyond the first order level of estimation, al-
though an attempt has been made to apply second-order rationale for
the Aerocrane and the 50-ton HLH where possible. The data base used
for this stud_ _erives from studies conducted by several airframe
: manufacturers_, _ for the U.S. Navy, but it necessary, to point out
:,: that neither these data, nor the conclusions thus reached in the
" present study represent the official policies of the Department
_., of the Navy.
_ TABLE II v
Typical Second-Order Cost Estimating Factors
(shown for illustration only)
Dollars
Component Per Pound
I. MAIN ROTOR GROUP 81.3
2. WING GROUP 99.S
3. TAIL ROTOR 100.0
4. TAIL SURFACES 24.7
5. BODY GROUP 99.5
6. ALIGHTING GEAR 46.5
7. FLIGHT CONTROLS I15.0
8. PROPULSION GROUP TREND
etc.
Effect of Productinn Numbers on Manufacturing Costs In proposing
new aircraft, major airframe companies speak of a learning curve, or
a price-quantity relationship that accounts for the fact that, during
82
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: a production run, many cost-reducing factors will materialize that
act to steadily decrease the unit aircraft cost. As an example, the
first production aircraft (actually the tenth actual aircraft, allow-
' ing for preproduction prototypes) might cost $10 million, a figure
that historical trends and other data migh; predict to be halved at
the 100-aircraft mark. According to a linear-legarithmic relation-
ship, this predicts that the tenth production aircraft should cost
- about $8 million, hence the term "80% learning curve" that would be
,:' cited in this instance. The production rate influences this figure
due to
_, significantly, mostly the effect of fixed costs that must be
_ written off during productionS; a half-rate might change this figure
to 85%. But the important aspect to note here is the profound effect
that production numbers have on average unit costs. With an 80% .
learning curve, the average cost is about 64% of the tenth aircraft ,et
_ cost, if 100 aircraft are produced; th_s figure further diminishes
' to 35% if the total production is increased to 1000. Another bene-
< ficial effect of production numbers is, of course, in the unit
amortization of development costs.
'_ Since it is difficult to envision heavy lift aircraft of whatever
_.-- descriptlon being produced in numbers greater than several hundred,
, the basis for estimating prcduction costs has been set at runs of one
hundred and two hundred aircraft, in an attempt to illustrate this
effect. In so doing, we have assumed an 805 learning curve. Current
trends indicate this figure to be on the low side.
_." Development Cost_ Airframe manufacturers' data6 and a study of cur-
rent trends indicate a development cost of $380M (]973 dollars) for
the 50-ton HLH. This assumes the use of developed engines and
avionics. For purposes of comparison, a separate study (1971) per-
formed under U.S. Army contract estimated development costs for a
, 24-ton HLH at SS55M, which included $90M for engine development, $60M
_" for a new rotor test facility, and $30M for avionics development.i
* Therefore, our figure appears to be the correct order of magnitude.
;:; For the Aerocrane, a figure of $165M has be_n developed, which
includes allowances for developmental problens in engine installation,
_' and the desigv and development of propellers that will be required to
match engine performance with the Icw speed environment. This figure
is considerably in excess of that predicted by All American Engineer-
ing.
Flyaway and Investment Costs - For this study, the flyaway cost is
taken as 110% of the production cost, which includes net profit and
marketing costs, such as ferrying and crew training. To this is
added another 20% which, to the order of accuracy sought here, repre-
sents the initial spares allocation, which is comprised of 50_ of the .
basic engine cost, and 25% of the basic airframe and equipment costs.
Both the Aerocrane and the HLH appear to be well represented by this
_pproximation.
Table Ill summarizes the total acquisition costs for the two air-









,_ Acquisition Costs vs Production Run,
80_ Learning Curve, 1973 MS
Aerocrane (100/200 A/C) S0-Ton HLH
R_D 165/165 578/578
Mfg Cost (tot.) 364.5/614.5 1570/2648
Unit Cost 5.27/3.89 19.46/15.15 _.
Flyaway Cost I 5.80/4.28 21.41/16.64
Invest. Cost 2 6.85/5.06 25.50/19.67
I. Flyaway Cost = 110_ Unit Cost -
2. Invest. Cost = 150_ Unit Cost _
Operating Costs - In developing operating costs, the following
rationale was employed: a) Specific fuel consumption is taken
nominally to be 0.5 lb-fuel/HP-hr, and fuel costs _150/per ton. b) ¢
-'" Maintenance hours per flight hour (both scheduled and unscheduled) is
estimated to be 7 hrs for the HLH vs 5 hrs for the Aerocrane, dimin- .e
ishing linearly to 5 hrs after two years of operational experience,
and costs $8 per hour. c) Crew costs are $90 per hour, which includes
overhead, d) Non-productive flight time _e.g., ferrying, training)
., represents 20_ of total utilization, el Hangaring an4 insurance costs
are not included, f) Initial cost includes 20_ for spares, which are
replenished annually at a rate of 5_ of the original flyaway price.
g) True interest rate on the debt is 5_ after allowances are made
for depreciation and interest tax deductions. With these assumptions,
the following average annual operating costs were develope_ (Table IV)
based on 10 years life cycle.
, TABLE IV
Average I0 yr Hourly Operating Costs
for 600/1200 flight hours per year
(1973 dollars, 1974 fuel prices)
5




Conclusions: In this paper, the attempt has been to combine reason-
able t_chnological projections with representative, current costing
rationale as a means of determining, to first order, the costs assoc-
iated with heavy lift capability. While the exactitude of numbers
developed in a study of this scope is always open to question, it is
felt that they are of the correct order of magnitude, and almost cer-
tainly of correct relative magnitude in the comparisons that have
been made. In all phases of development, manufacture, and operation,
the Aerocrane emerges as considerably more cost effective than the




Iheavy lift device, where part of the lift is gotten for free, so to
speak. Costs, like _eight, have a way of "snowballing" in advanccd,
state o£ art aircraft, which the 50-ton machine represents. Part of
this escalation derives from obvious physical causes, such as the nec-
essity to develop better materials, to keep empty weight fractions
within bounds. Somewhat less oSviously, there is a "cost-risk"
spiral that has become ever-increasingly a dominating cost element £n
new aircraft development; whether this can be avoided in the develop-
ment of LTA technology would make an interesting study in itself.
As remarked earlier, lack o£ details argued against the comparable
cost analysis of Gargantua, and it is hoped that this paper will be
useful for comkarative purposes, when this information is £orthcoi_ing. ,_
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